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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DORRIS CYPERT 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF 
WASHINGrroN COUNTY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, SHELDON B. JOHN-
SON, FINLEY M. JUDD, FRED-
ERICK R. BRUECK, GARY T. 
MOORE, DR. WALTER H. SNOW, 
1WNALD V. McARTHUR and T. 
LAVOY ESPLIN, 
Def end ants and Appellarnts. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
12071 
This is an action brought to enjoin the issuance and 
sale of school building bonds authorized at a bond elec-
tion held May 27, 1969 brought by Plaintiff and Re-
spondent on behalf of herself and a class of others 
similarly situated who are all qualified electors of Wash-
ington County School District but who did not pay a 
tax on property located therein within the twelve months 
preceding the election. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
After the trial of the case including the taking of 
testimony, arguments by counsel and submitting of 
briefs, the District Court rendered its Memorandum De-
cision (R. 83-87) and entered detailed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law (R. 88-97) and final Judgment 
(R. 99-100). The defendants were enjoined from issu-
ing or selling any of the bonds authorized at the May 
27, 1969 bond election. In addition, the property tax re-
quirement for voting at bond elections provided for in 
Article XIV, Section 3, Utah Constitution, Section 
11-14-2 and 11-14-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, and any 
other Utah constitutional or statutory provision con-
taining similar provisions was declared unconstitutional 
as a violation of the United States Constitution. The 
court further declared such property tax limitation was 
severable from the remainder of the bond election pro-
visions so as to permit a future bond election to be held 
where property tax payment is not a prerequisite to 
voting. Finally, the court determined that the decision 
would apply prospectively only and would not affect 
the validity of any bonds issued in this state when the 
period for contesting the validity of the bond election 
had expired prior to June 16, 1969. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Respondent seeks affirmance of the Judg-
ment of the District Court in its entirety. 
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STAT~J:MENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff-Respondent accepts the Statement of Facts 
of Appellants. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PROPERTY TAX LIMITATION IN 
BOND ELECTIONS FOR ALL TYPES OF 
BONDS VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTEC-
TION CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH 
Al\1ENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION. 
The essential problem of this case is a limitation on 
\'Oting, a limitation which amounts to a state classifica-
tion of qualified resident voters between those who pay 
real or personal property taxes and those who do not 
pay such taxes. Because of the decision of this court 
in Thompson v. City of Centerville, 18 U.2d 174, 417 
P.2d 670 (1966) our present statutes and State Con-
stitution make an even stricter classification by allow-
ing the vote only to those persons in whose name on 
the assessment list real or personal property taxes are 
assessed and denying the vote to spouses of such tax-
payers and to persons in whose name taxes are not 
assessed even though such persons in fact pay the tax 
on the property that is assessed (for example, contract 
purchasers of real property). 
vV e rely principally on three recent decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court: Harper v. Virginia. State 
Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 16 L.Ed.2d 169, 86 
S.Ct. 1079 (1966); Kra(rner v. Union Free School District, 
395 U.S. 621, 23 L.Ed.2d 583, 89 S.Ct. 1886 (1969); 
Cipriano v. City of Hourna, 395 U.S. 701, 23 L.Ed.2d 647, 
89 S.Ct. 1897 (1969). 
The three cases above referred to establish three 
general propositions. First: The political subdivision 
or the state may not rely upon the alleged ''reasonable-
ness" of the classification of voters in bond elections 
or any presumption of constitutionality of such classi-
fication. Second: Is the classification "necessary" to 
promote a compelling state interest? Third: If the 
classification is necessary, is there a compelling state 
interest which overcomes the presumption that denial 
of the right to Yote on grounds of wealth is "invidious 
discrimination" under the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment? 
The Supreme Court in the Kram er case, supra, held 
that the right to vote is such a fundamental right under 
our system of government that any denial of such right 
is carefully scrutinized and the normal presumption of 
constitutionality does not apply. The court noted that 
the basis for the presumption of constitutionality is the 
assumption ''that the institutions of state government 
are structured so as to represent fairly all the people.'' 
When this basic assumption is challenged as it is in con-
testing legislation which denies some people the right 
to participate in important public decisions, the assump-
tion cannot be used as a basis for presuming constitu-
4 
tionality of the questioned statute. (Kramer, supra, 23 
L.Ed.2d at 590). 
Again in the Harper case, supra, the Supreme Court 
stated (16 L.Ed.2d at 173): 
Lines drawn on the basis of wealth or property, 
like those of race ... , are traditionally disfavored. 
As Circuit Judge Wisdom stated it in Stewart v. Parish 
School Board of the Pa,rish of St. Charles (U.S.D.C., E. 
Dist., La; February 25, 1970), 310 F.Supp. 1172: 
In other situations, ... the defenders of a statu-
tory classification have the light burden of find-
ing that the legislative scheme has a rational 
basis. Here they must meet "the exacting stand-
ard of precision'' required of ''statutes which 
selectively distribute the franchise.'' 
Thus the rule established by these cases is that limita-
tions on the right to vote and denials of the right to vote 
·will be carefully scrutinized and must be fully justified. 
The second proposition - whether the classifica-
tion is necessary to promote a compelling state interest 
- has been the principal area for examination in recent 
cases. The basis for this proposition was stated in the 
Kramer case as follows : 
Statutes granting the franchise to residents on 
a selective basis always pose the danger of deny-
ing some citizens any effective voice in the gov-
ernmental affairs which substantially affect their 
lives. Therefore, if a challenged state statute 
grants the right to vote to some bona fide resi-
dents of requisite age and citizenship and denies 
the franchise to others, the Court must determine 
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whether the exclusions are necessary to promote 
a compelling state interest. (23 L.Ed.2d at 589) 
The Kramer case involved a challenge to a New 
York Statute providing for school district elections. In 
the type of school district operating under the law in 
question, a person could vote at the school election only 
if he was an owner or the lessee, or the spouse of an 
owner or lessee, of taxable real property, or was the 
parent or guardian of children currently enrolled in the 
public school system. The plaintiff in the Kramer case 
was a bachelor who owned no property rendered for 
taxation but vrns an otherwise qualified elector of the 
school district. The thrust of the statute went to the 
right to vote at the annual meeting of the school district 
at which eligible voters who were present could vote on 
matters of local taxation, could approve the school budget 
and in certain instances could vote taxes for school 
building purposes. 
The arguments articulating the state interest were 
first, since it could be reasonably concluded that prop-
erty taxpayers, and lessees . who have the tax burden 
through rental payments, would be more interested be-
cause of the effect on their pocketbook, those were the 
persons who were primarily interested, plus the par-
ents of children. Second, it was argued that only those 
two classes of persons could be expected to understand 
the complex questions dealing with school problems 
which were to be voted upon, because non-parents were 
not as well informed about school problems as were 
parents with children in the school system. It was ar-
6 
gued that those electors who paid taxes or rented prop-
erty, even though they might not have children in school 
would sec to it that they obtained the necessary informa-
tion to intelligently vote on the questions presented at 
the school meetings. In discussing the arguments of-
fered on behalf of the state in defense of its classifi-
cation, the court stated: 
\Vhether classifications allegedly limiting the 
franchise to those resident citizens "primarily 
interested'' deny those excluded equal protection 
of law depends, inter alia, on whether all those 
excluded are in fact substantially less interested 
or affected than those the statute includes. In 
other words, the classifications must be tailored 
so that the exclusion of appellant and members 
of his class is necessary to achieve the articulated 
state goal. Section 2012 does not meet the exact-
ing standards of precision we require of statutes 
which selectively distribute the franchise. The 
classifications in Section 2012 permit inclusion 
of many persons who have, at best, a remote and 
indirect interest in school affairs and on the other 
hand, exclude others who have a distinct and di-
rect interest in the school meeting decisions. 
The court then enumerated other classes of persons 
who were also denied the right to vote under the New 
York law and held that there were others who were also 
interested in the school meeting decisions and who were 
not permitted to vote, and concluded that since those 
denied the right to vote were not substantially less in-
terested or affected, the statute was unconstitutional. 
It is to be noted that the court specifically stated that 
it did not reach the question of whether the interest pro-
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moted by the state in excluding non-taxpayers from vot-
ing constituted a compelling state interest which would 
escape the taint of "invidious discrimination." 
The holding in the Kramer case was a development 
of the principle of the Harper case decided in 1966 where 
a state poll tax was declared invalid. The Supreme Court 
there stated : 
We conclude that a State violates the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or 
payment of any fee an electoral standard. Voter 
qualifications have no relation to wealth nor to 
paying or not paying this or any other tax. Our 
cases demonstrate that the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment restrains 
the States from fixing voter qualifications which 
invidiously discriminate (16 L.Ed.2d at 172). 
The Cipriarno case, decided on the same day as 
Kramer, comes closest to the facts of this case in that 
a bond election was involved, there a city electric revenue 
bond. The applicable Louisiana Statute required ap-
proval by a majority in number and amount of the tax-
payers qualified to vote who chose to vote at the bond 
election. The court, relying principally on the Kramer 
case, held that it violated the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to deny the vote to non-
taxpayers. This determination was based on the prin-
ciple that those excluded from the vote were not sub-
stantially less interested or affected than those per-
mitted to vote. For these types of bonds payable from 
utility rates and only indirectly affecting property val-
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ues and property taxes, there is no justification for dif-
ferentiating between property taxpayers and non-prop-
erty taxpayers. This is not to say that property tax-
payers have no interest, but only that there is no justifi-
able reason for excluding non-property taxpayers when 
both groups are substantially affected by the operation 
of the city-owned electric system. 
Coming now to the facts of this case, we are dealing 
with a classification under Utah law which allows some 
persons to vote at bond elections who have a remote 
and indirect interest in school affairs and excludes other 
persons, like plaintiff, who have a distinct and direct 
interest. Is such a classification "necessary" 1 Under 
the Utah statutes and Constitution, spouses, contract 
purchasers, senior citizens, and others living with chil-
dren, or relatives living with children or other relatives, 
lessees of property, clergy, military, and others living 
on tax-exempt property who are not also assessed with 
personal property, and the parents of children enrolled 
in the public school system who neither own real or per-
sonal property like the plaintiff are prevented from vot-
ing at either a revenue bond or general obligation bond 
election. Can it be seriously argued that such persons 
enumerated above have no interest worth Constitutional 
protection in the outcome of a bond election 1 Each of 
the classes are substantially interested in and substan-
tially affected by the question of the issuance of bonds 
to build school buildings. 
Under the classifications drawn by the Utah Con-
stitution and statutes, a person owning an automobile 
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and paying a personal property tax thereon in a signifi-
cantly small amount may vote at a school bond election, 
whereas parents who do not own an automobile and 
who rent their residence and have children in the public 
schools may not vote at the school bond election, even 
though they ultimately pay a property tax because the 
rental which they pay for their housing includes a por-
tion of the tax burden. An even greater anomaly is the 
contract purchaser of property who in fact pays taxes 
on the property but, because the property is not assessed 
in his name, is not entitled to vote. See Thompson v. 
City of Centerville, supra. The court can take judicial 
notice of the fact that the customary form of uniform 
real estate contract in this state requires the buyer to 
pay the property taxes and can further take notice of 
the significant number of real estate transactions handled 
under such a form of contract. 
The plaintiff has rented a residence in St. George 
within the boundaries of the Washington County School 
District. The property in which she resides is listed on 
the tax rolls of Washington County, Utah. Real prop-
erty taxes on such property have been paid to Wash-
ington County and a portion of these remitted to Wash-
ington County School District as provided by Utah law. 
Plaintiff pays state income and sales taxes, a portion 
of which are returned by the State Legislature to the 
Washington County School District. 
The Supreme Court in the Kramer case specifically 
recognized the interest of lessees of real property, such 
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as plaintiff, in the payment of taxes indirectly and also 
the interest of non-property taxpayers in the effect on 
the general price level of taxes levied by political sub-
divisions. It is not sufficient therefore to argue that 
because those electors who are listed on the tax rolls 
and who pay a property tax are the electors who are 
"primarily" affected by a bond issue or tax, such state 
f'lassifica tions are valid under the requirements laid 
down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the 
Kram er and Cipriano cases, supra. The owners of prop-
erty may have only a slight and minimal interest in the 
outcome of a bond election or the levy of taxes, whereas 
non-property owning spouses, contract purchasers, les-
sees and non-property taxpaying parents of children 
may have a vital interest in the outcome of the election 
and in the quality and structure of public education. 
In addition to the question of whether or not the bonds 
shall be issued, bond elections present to communities 
hasic decisions which can vitally affect the future of 
the public education system in the school district. For 
example, the passage of a bond election to build a par-
ticular school or to complete a particular building pro-
gram may, because of the status of the debt limit of the 
school district under the Utah Constitution, mean that 
for many years in the future that school district will 
not be able to incur additional bond indebtedness, there-
fore precluding the issuance of additional bonds for 
cliff ercnt or additional building projects. The question 
presented to the voters at a school bond election results 
in bringing into focus the interests of parents of chil-
drC'n concerning the wise expenditure of the debt incur-
11 
ring power of the school district for one as against an-
other school project. The decision called for at a bond 
election can have a substantial effect on the classes of 
persons listed above who are now excluded from voting 
under the Utah law. 
The principal argument of Appellant is that because 
property taxpayers can be subjected to a tax to pay the 
bonds which are being voted on, there is a compelling 
state interest in limiting the vote to such property tax-
payers. It is the familiar argument that the one paying 
the bill should decide whether the bill should be incurred. 
The argument has three basic fallacies: First, that prop-
erty taxpayers in Utah in fact pay the bill, second, that 
all property taxpayers are permitted to vote, and, third, 
that the interest of non-property taxpayers in the out-
come of bond elections can be ignored. 
With regard to the first fallacy, property taxes have 
ceased to be the principal support for school districts 
and for cities, towns and counties in the state. Schools in 
the state receive substantial amounts of state aid and the 
source of this state money is largely due from the Uni-
form School Fund which is made up of a number of 
sources including all of the revenues from the corporate 
franchise tax, all of the revenues from the individual 
income tax, a portion of rentals due the state from 
federal mineral leases and by appropriations from the 
general fund of the state for which sales tax revenues 
provide a major source (See Article X, Section 3, Utah 
Constitution; 53-7-1U.C.A.1953). 
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According to the publication of the Utah State Board 
of Education dated June 25, 1969 entitled Annual Esti-
mated 2\finimum School Report of Utah School Districts 
1969-70, it was estimated that the state supported mini-
mum school program in the Washington County School 
District would be financed 82% by state funds and ap-
proximately 18% by local funds (See also R. 41). Cities, 
towns and counties have authority to impose license taxes 
and fees (10-8-39, 10-8-80, 17-5-27 Utah Code Annotated 
1953), impose sales taxes (Chapter 9, Title 11, U.C.A. 
1953) and receive some forms of state aid themselves 
(See 27-12-129, 32-1-24 and 41-11-11(2), U.C.A. 1953). 
Thus it is the plaintiff and others who don't pay 
property tax but who pay state income taxes, sales taxes 
and license fees and other charges to local governmental 
units who pay a very significant part of the bill for the 
support of these local governments including moneys 
which may in fact be used for payment of principal and 
interest on bonds (approximately $50,000 of state bond-
ing aid funds usable solely for redemption of general 
obligation bonds was expected by the Washington County 
School District for the 1969-70 fiscal year, Tr. 9; Find-
ings of Fact 9 and 10, R. 91). 
Now it is said that it is only the property taxpayers 
whose property will be subject to tax to pay the bonds. 
It is true that general obligation bonds in Utah contain 
a covenant that a property tax sufficient to pay the prin-
cipal and interest on the bonds shall be levied (See Sec-
tion 6 of the Bond Ordinance here, R. 36). But this is not 
the full story because the same section provides that 
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other funds that may be in the treasury can be used to 
pay the principal and interest on the bonds and to that 
extent the levy of property tax can be diminished. In 
many cases the governmental entity issuing the bonds 
fully intends to pay for the bonds out of other revenues 
without the levy of the property tax, but issues general 
obligation bonds to obtain the lower interest rate such 
bonds will command in the marketplace. A recent exam-
ple is the issue by Salt Lake City of general obligation 
bonds for the Hogle Zoo. The bonds will be paid from 
gate receipts at the Zoo. Similarly, airport bonds, electric 
system bonds, and water and sewer bonds are often is-
sued as general obligation bonds even though the rev-
enues from these facilities ·will in fact be used by the 
issuer to pay the principal and interest on the bonds. In 
such a case is there not a direct violation of the Cipriano 
case if only property taxpayers are permitted to vote on 
such a bond? 
Consider also that Utah general obligation bonds 
typically provide on the face of the bond form itself (See 
R. 34) a covenant that the "full faith and credit" of the 
issuer is pledged to the payment of the principal and 
interest on the bond. It is not simply a pledge of the 
property tax revenues of the issuer or a requirement that 
a property tax be levied. All of the credit of the issuer 
is obligated. Thus, Utah by tradition in its bonding prac-
tices and under its bond election laws is different from 
Oklahoma, Idaho and Louisiana where property taxes 
apparently must be levied in order to pay for the bonds. 
Where Article 10, Section 27, and Article 10, Section 35 
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of the Oklahoma Constitution specifically require the im-
position of a property tax to pay the principal and inter-
est on the types of bonds ref erred to in those sections, 
it is perhaps not surprising that the property tax require-
ment for voting was sustained in Settle v. The City of 
Muskogee, (Okla., 1970) 462 P.2d 642 and Settle v. The 
Hoard of County Commissioners of the County of Mus-
kogee, (Okla., 1970) 462 P.2d 646. There the imposition 
of not only a tax but a new tax is a legal requirement. 
Similar provisions of Idaho and Louisiana law were the 
basis for the holdings in JJf uench v. Paine, (Ida., 1970) 
463 P.2d 939 and H arndy v. The Parish School Board of 
the Parish of Acadia, (Ct. App. La., 1970). While we 
question these rulings and consider them contrary to the 
Supreme Court decisions, they are certainly not direct 
precedents against our contentions because Utah has no 
such requirement. The three judge District Court inKolo-
dzjejski v. City of Phoernrix, (U.S.D.C. Ariz., Nov. 17, 
1969) ______ F.Supp. ______ , had no difficulty in arriving at a 
contrary result and applying the Cipriano rule to general 
obligation bonds issued in Arizona. Note the similarity 
between Title 9, Sec. 782 Arizona Revised Statutes and 
the wording of the first sentence of 11-14-2, U.C.A. 1953. 
The second fallacy in the argument of Appellants is 
assuming that all bill payers for the bonds (which Appel-
lauts equate with property taxpayers) are permitted to 
vote. This must be the assumption because it makes little 
sense for Appellants to claim that only part of the bill 
payers are the only ones entitled to decide whether the 
bill should be incurred. Yet this is the dilemma. in which 
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Appellants are placed. It must be conceded that a corpor-
ation cannot vote because it is not a qualified elector but 
it is well known that corporations pay most of the prop-
erty taxes in this state. It is clear from Thompson v. City 
of Centerville, supra, that the fact of payment of the tax 
itself by a contract purchaser or by a wife or husband is 
not sufficient if the tax is not assessed in the name of the 
one who pays. This leads to the further absurdity that 
one in whose name a tax is assessed can vote even though 
he pays no tax and will not in the future. Consider also 
the non-resident of Washington County School District 
who cannot vote even though he is assessed for a tax and 
pays it. 
The third fallacy in Appellants' basic argument is 
ignoring the very substantial interest of non-property 
taxpayers in the outcome of the bond election. It seems 
to be assumed that because the property taxpayers may 
be taxed to pay for the bond, that it follows as night to 
day that only they should be permitted to vote on the 
bonds. If pecuniary interest is the only constitutionally 
significant interest, how can the sales taxes, income 
taxes, license fees and other types of revenues paid by 
non-property taxpayers be ignored~ But we contend 
other interests must also be weighed in the balance. The 
interest, here, of plaintiff with a son in junior high 
school, concerned with the quality of education her son is 
to receive and with the school facilities he is using, is an 
interest that cannot be ignored. As the Supreme Court 
said in the Harper case : 
Wealth, like race, creed, or color, is not germane 
to one's ability to participate intelligently in the 
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electoral process ... To introduce wealth or pay-
ment of a fee as a measure of a voter's qualifica-
tions is to introduce a capricious or irrelevant 
factor. 
When one is concerned with the proper expenditure of 
funds for which bonds are to be issued, the concern does 
not originate only because of the potential imposition of 
a property tax. Of much greater interest to the intelli-
gent citizen is that the new school buildings, the improve-
ments to the airport, the extensions to the electric system, 
the new reservoirs for the water system, the new sewage 
treatment plant are needed at the time and that the funds 
authorized will be wisely used for such purposes. For 
such considerations, past payment of property taxes or 
future imposition of additional property taxes is com-
pletely irrelevant. This is not to minimize the interest of 
the property taxpayer in general obligation bond elec-
tions, but only to suggest that under the principles of 
the Supreme Court cases this interest is not the exclusive 
interest in determining the constitutionality of the classi-
fication. The non-property taxpayers are as much and in 
many cases more interested in the outcome of the election 
than the property taxpayer. 
But if the court should find that the classification is 
"necessary," is there such a compelling state interest 
which justifies a denial of the vote? Circuit Judge Wis-
dom set this question to rest by stating in Stewa,rt v. The 
Parish School Boa.rd of the Pa.risk of St. Charles, supra: 
The State's compelling interest in fixing the qual-
ifications of voters in school bond elections is to 
delegate to the voters in each school district the 
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authority to improve public education in their dis-
trict. That objective is certainly not promoted by 
excluding parents and guardians of school chil-
dren and others who cannot be characterized as 
having a substantially less interest in public edu-
cation than property taxpayers. In terms of the 
effect of the ... election, the excluded groups may 
be more seriously affected than the taxpayers, 
many of whom have a proper interest in avoiding 
arbitrary taxes but little or no interest in public 
schools. 
Finally, we note that the Cipriano case has already 
invalidated the Utah constitutional and statutory provi-
sions as they relate to voted revenue bonds. The cases 
of Fjeldsted v. Ogden City, 83 Utah 278, 28 P.2d 144 and 
JVadsicorth v. Santaquin City, 83 Utah 321, 28 P.2d 161, 
established what is known as the restricted special fund 
doctrine by requiring an election pursuant to Article 
XIV, Section 3 of the Utah Constitution for revenue 
bonds if the bonds purported to pledge revenues which 
theretofore went into general funds of the issuer and 
could have been used to reduce property taxes or other 
taxes on residents of the issue·r. A property taxpayer 
election would be required even though only revenues and 
not property taxes are obligated for payment of the 
bonds. As conceded by Appellants (Brief p. 22), such a 
requirement is contrary to the direct holding of the Cipri-
an.a case. It appears to Respondent that since Ciprian.a 
voids the Utah property tax requirement for Utah rev-
enue bonds, the same rule should be applied for Utah 
general obligation bonds since it is the identical constitu-
tional and statutory provisions and the identical limita-
tion of those provisions which apply in both cases. 
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POINT II 
THE ACTION rs NOT BARRED BY THE 40-
DAY ELECTION CONTEST PERIOD PRO-
VIDED BY SECTION 11-14-12, UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 1953. 
The court below concluded (R. 95) that the 40-day 
coutest period of Section 11-14-12, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, had not expired on June 16, 1969 when the Cipria;n.o 
case was decided. Appellants first argue that because the 
Cipriarn.o case applies only to revenue bonds, this conclu-
sion is erroneous or, I suppose more accurately, imma-
terial. But as we have pointed out in Point I and will 
not repeat here, the principles of the Cipriamo case apply 
to Utah general obligation bonds as well as to Utah rev-
enue bonds. Knowing that such principles could affect 
outstanding bonds and pending plans of governmental 
units proposing to issue bonds, the court in Cipriano was 
careful to state that the decision would not apply retro-
actively either to bonds which had been sold or issued 
prior to the decision or "where, under state law, the time 
for challenging the election result has not expired ... '' 
(23 L.Ed.2d at 652). But it follows that the decision will 
be applied where, as here, the time for contesting the 
bond election had not expired on the date of the Cipria;no 
decision. 
Appellants next point to the Louisiana cases apply-
ing a short statute of limitations to bond election contests. 
The basis for any limitation statute is the desire to pre-
vent stale claims from being raised. A short statute of 
limitations for election contests has the further important 
19 
purpose of making certain the results of an election at 
an early date after the election is held so that public 
action can be taken based on the election, such as the 
taking of office of the official elected or, in a bond elec-
tion, the issuance of the bonds. While fully recognizing 
the importance of such a principle in the ordinary bond 
election where within the 40-day period the United States 
Supreme Court has cast Federal constitutional doubts on 
the validity of the election, plaintiff here should certainly 
be permitted to bring these Federal constitutional ques-
tions to the attention of the State courts of Utah. Because 
of these constitutional doubts, no bonds have been issued 
and no investors have been or will be hurt by the issuance 
of the injunction. The school district here involved has 
been given new guidelines for the holding of a valid new 
election and can now proceed to do so. The purpose of 
the short statute of limitations is to safeguard bonds that 
have been issued and such purpose is not violated. It was 
perhaps because of this that the court in K olodzjejski r. 
City of Phoenix, supra, noted non-compliance with Ari-
zona's 5-day statute but nevertheless decided the case. 
Also note Handy v. Parish School Board of the Parish 
of Acadia, supra, where the court determined the consti-
tutional issues even though holding that the action was 
not timely filed. 
Furthermore, limitation statutes of this sort do not 
Lar constitutional claims. Board of Educatio11 of City of 
Aztec 1·. Hartley, 7 4 N.l\L 469, 394 P.2d 985; Boa.rrl of 
Education of Gallup Municipal School v. Robinson, 57 
N.~I. 445, 259 P.2d 1028; Taos County Board of Educa-
ti:on i:. Sedillo, 44 N.:ir. 300, 101 P.2d 1027: TVliite r. 
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Board of Education of Silver City, 42 N.M. 94, 75 P.2d 
112. Benedict v. City of New York, 247 Fed. 758, cited 
by Appellants (Brief p. 27), is not, when properly ana-
lyzed, a contrary holding. There the action was filed 
seventeen years after the cause of action had accrued. 
While the court threw out the case because of the equit-
able doctrine of laches and chose not to apply the State 
six or ten year statute of limitations, this is a far differ-
ent case than the 40-day statute of limitations here in-
rnh'ed. 
Finally, and most importantly, the application of the 
contest period at most only bars the part of the court's 
decision granting the injunction against issuance of the 
bonds. It certainly does not bar the relief sought by 
plaintiff and granted by the court below declaring the 
property tax requirement at bond elections to be uncon-
stitutional. (See Complaint, paragraph B, page 10, R. 
10) The question is an important one to resolve because 
of the great public interest in this question. The Idaho 
Supreme Court in Muench v. Paine, supra, noted the con-
tinuing need of school districts in Idaho for additional 
buildings, classrooms and other new construction which 
can only be met by raising funds from the sale of bonds. 
The Idaho Court specifically noted that ''at present, the 
bond issues of the State that have been approved are not 
salable in the open market." The same facts apply with 
equal force in Utah. 
POINT III 
THE COURT BELOW WAS CORRECT IN 
HOLDING THAT THE PROPERTY TAX 
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REQUIREMENT FOR VOTING IN BOND 
ELECTIONS IN THE UTAH CONSTITU-
TIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
ARE SEVERABLE AND THAT DEFEND-
ANTS AND APPELLANTS ARE AUTHOR-
IZED TO HOLD GENERAL OBLIGATION 
BOND ELECTIONS AS LONG AS THE 
PROPOSITION IS NOT LIMITED TO TAX-
PAYERS. 
\Ve agree with the argument of Appellants in Point 
III and refer the court to Appellants' argument in their 
Brief, pages 31-34. 
In addition, we wish to point out to the Court the 
importance of a determination of this severability point. 
A ho1diug that the property tax requirement for voting is 
unconstitutional, standing alone, leaves open the question 
''where do we go from here?'' 
One alternative is that no bond elections can be held 
and no bonds issued by any city, tovvn, county or school 
district because the source of authority for such bond 
elections and, indeed, for the very issuance of the bonds 
themselves is compliance with Article XIV, Section 3, 
Utah Constitution. That being impossible because the 
property tax limitation is in violation of the Federal 
Constitution, the only alternative is to amend the Utah 
Constitution to delete the unconstitutional portion. 
The second alternative is to adopt the more rational 
approach of the trial court that the property tax limita-
tion itself is severable and the remaining portions of 
Article XIV, Section 3 and of onr statutor~' provision:; 
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can still be used as the source of authority for the issu-
ance of bonds and the holding of bond elections. The 
only difference will be that the unconstitutional part, the 
property tax limitation, will be eliminated and bonds 
which formerly could only be authorized at property tax 
bond elections can now be authorized at elections at which 
any qualified voter may vote. It is as if Article XIV, 
Section 3 is treated as reading as follows (omitted matter 
shown in brackets - added words italicized): 
No debt in excess of the taxes for the current year 
shall be created by any county or subdivision 
thereof, or by any school district therein, or by 
any city, town or village, or any subdivision there-
of in this state; unless the proposition to create 
such debt, shall have been submitted to a vote of 
the [such] qualified electors thereof [as shall 
have paid a property tax therein, in the year pre-
ceding such election,] and a majority of those 
voting thereon shall have voted in favor of incur-
ring such debt. 
In this manner will be retained the essential purpose of 
the framers of the Constitution - that bonds may be 
issued by cities, towns, counties and school districts but 
only after long term bonds are authorized at an election 
by a majority vote of those voting. It would seem unreal-
istic to assume that the property tax requirement was so 
fundamental that the framers would rather have had no 
bonds at all rather than bonds issued after an election at 
which all qualified electors voted. The severability rule 
has been long recognized and applied by all courts (See 
16 Am. J ur.2d 409, Constitutional Law, Section 181) and 
recognized by this Court (See Smith v. Ca,rbon County, 
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95 Utah 340, 81 P.2d 370; Stillnia~z v. Lynch, 56 Utah 540, 
192 Pac. 272, 12 A.L.R. 552; Riggins v. District Court, 
89 Utah 183, 51 P.2d 645). 
If the contrary result is reached, Article XIV, Sec-
tion 3, will require amendment. At present our Consti-
tution can be amended only at a general election after 
two-thirds of all the members elected to each of the 
two houses of the Legislature shall have voted in favor 
of submitting the proposed amendment to the electors 
and after the proposed amendment has been published 
for two months immediately preceding the general elec-
tion. The next general election is November 1970 and 
an amendment would require a special session of the 
Legislature to be called in August or prior thereto 
(presumably following the decision of this Court). The 
Legislature would then pass the proposed amendment 
and it would be promptly published so that it could be 
submitted in November. If this strict time table is not 
reached, no amendment could be considered until No-
vember 1972. In the meantime, public projects would 
languish because no general obligation bonds and many 
revenue bonds could not be issued by any city, town, 
county or school district. If for no other reason than 
to avoid this result, the declaration of severability should 
be affirmed. 
POINT IV 
ANY DECISION OF THIS COURT 
WITH RESPECT TO THE VALIDITY OF 
THE BONDS SHOULD BE MADE PROS-
PECTIVE ONLY. 
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We agree with Appellants Point IV and the reasons 
for it except that we see no reason to have a different 
date than June 16, 1969 as the applicable date for the 
decision. This was the date adopted by the trial court 
and, of course, coincides with the date of the Cipriano 
decision. 
As to bonds which have been issued and are in the 
hands of holders, we join in the request that this Court 
specifically state that any decision will not affect such 
bonds which have been actually issued and delivered 
prior to the date of this Court's opinion. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we respectfully request 
this Court to affirm the decision of the trial court in 
its entirety to the end that the uncertainties presently 
surrounding the authorization and issuance of general 
obligation bonds in this State are resolved at the earliest 
possible date. Important public projects are being de-
layed and will be delayed for an indefinite period in 
the future if this Court does not recognize the applica-
bility of the Cipriano,. K rarmer and Harper decisions to 
the Utah situation. 
Respectfully submitted, 
H. R. Waldo, Jr. of 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK 
& McDONOUGH 
Attorn,eys for Respondent 
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